The Post-Modern Praetorians
“The Post-Modern Praetorians” (TPMR) contains Alex Olteanu’s reflections and comments on topics touching on his “War in the Modern World” M.A. studies at King’s College, London, UKArchive for November, 2008
Was the Cold War an inevitable outcome of World War Two?
If we are to determine whether the Cold War (which I would define as the global ideological, political, economic and military conflict between the capitalist-democratic and the communist-totalitarian blocs short of direct mass warfare between the USA and the USSR) was indeed an “inevitable outcome” of WWII, I suggest we should start by outlining the key features of the international system in 1945-1948 which obtained directly as a result of that conflict. For our purposes, I would argue that the most important were:
Winston Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech in Fulton, Missouri, March 5, 1946
1) an utterly devastated continental Europe, with a shattered economy and a population on the brink of starvation;
2) an unprecedented power vacuum in Europe, northern Africa the Middle East and Asia-Pacific due to the collapse of France, Germany, Italy, Japan and (by mid-1947) the significant abdication of the UK of most if its positions in these areas;
3) the military breakthrough of an economically exhausted USSR to the heart of Europe -and Germany;
4) the willingness of the USA to exploit politically and ideologically its dominant economic and military position in the international system; and
5) the geographical collision, in Europe and Asia, of the US and the USSR -embodying two discrete systems of governance, each with universal ambitions and mutually exclusive on the political, economic and ideological levels.
The question to be answered, therefore, is whether these specific consequences of WWII rendered the Cold War inevitable.
In brief, I would argue that the cumulative effect between 1945 and 1948 of these five key outcomes of WWII rendered the Cold War (as defined above) “inevitable” indeed. By “inevitable” I mean that, given the “macro” features of the international system described above, the “mezo” nature and composition of the foreign policy networks of the USA and USSR which determined the dynamic evolution of the policies of these war-time allies with respect to each other between 1945 and 1948 would have led, sooner or later, to a Cold War between the two irrespective of the existence or actions of any individual personalities occupying positions of leadership in Moscow or Washington, DC. Four possible counter-arguments deserve particular attention:
Ideology: Gaddis does indeed state that no Cold War resulted between the USA and the USSR after WWI, despite identical ideologies; however, “the correlation of forces” at the end of WWI was entirely different from that after WWII:
1) with the important exception of north-western France and the BENELUX countries, Europe ( and in particular Germany, Central Europe and the UK) were not devastated economically;
2) no power vacuum obtained in Europe, the Mediterranean, or Asia; to the contrary, France, the UK and Japan expanded their colonial empires and Germany retained most of its national territory;
3) the USSR had suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the German Empire, ratified in the Treaty of Brest-Litowsk which (ironically!) reduced the former Russian Empire to the frontiers of today’s Russia; the Versailles Treaties reversed these losses but only partially and established a “cordon sanitaire” of approximately 12 countries between its western border and Berlin, Vienna and Istanbul; not only was the USSR NOT at the heart of Europe militarily, but it was isolated and fighting for its survival until 1921;
4) failure of the US Senate to ratify the League of Nations Treaty and Wilson’s subsequent stroke resulted in a return of the USA to an isolationist position for the next two decades, thus failing to take advantage politically or ideologically of its dominant economic and military position in 1919; and
5) for the reasons stated above (and with the exception of some ill-prepared and ultimately futile US and allied attempts to quell the Soviet revolution in Russia) no direct geographic collision of the USA and USSR took place at the end of WWI.
In sum, the different macro outcomes of WWI as compared with WWII explain the failure of a direct and sustained ideological confrontation between the USA and USSR, and not the fact that these ideologies were somehow capable of establishing a peaceful global cohabitation in spite of their irreconcilable differences and “ways of life”.
Realpolitik: As Zubok and Pleshakov explain in light of recent Soviet archive materials, the foreign policy paradigm of the Soviet foreign policy establishment (therefore not only of Stalin, but also Molotov, Litvinov, Maisky and Zhidanov) adhered to the same revolutionary-imperial paradigm resulting in a definition of security in primarily territorial terms. This paradigm resulted in Stalin’s failure to hold free elections in Poland and other East European countries, as he had committed himself to, and pushing his cards to the limit in Iran, Turkey, the Mediterranean and Central Europe -thus forcing a US foreign policy establishment -which had remained at least until February 1947 generally lenient towards the demands of the USSR- to radically shift its analysis of Soviet aims from those of a traditional great power to those of an ideologically-driven revolutionary state bent on global domination. Although Stalin’s personality and paranoia played an understandably important role in this process, there is no documentary evidence to assume that, had he died or been replaced at the same time with Roosevelt and Churchill, the ultimate long-term outcome would have been any different.
Personal mistrust: any level of “trust” between Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt established during WWII was largely based on their forced cooperation to defeat a common enemy. Although Roosevelt did indeed think he could “handle Uncle Joe”, before his death he realized that the Soviet dictator could not be trusted; on March 24, 1945 he stated, angrily, that “Averell [Harriman] is right; we can’t do business with Stalin. He has broken every one of the promises he made at Yalta.” (R.J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, p. 11). A few days later (April 6), he cabled to Churchill: “I am very pleased with your very clear strong message to Stalin… Our armies will in a very few days be in a position that will permit us to become “tougher” than has heretofore appeared advantageous to the war effort” (Ibid, p. 12). Stalin’s actions were in fact in flagrant contradiction with the terms of the Atlantic Charter regarding freedom, self-determination and democracy of all nations and the fact the Churchill and Roosevelt had given priority to the defeat of Nazi Germany and tolerated Stalin’s violations of his promises until the end of the war by no means implies that they would have continued to do so after the conclusion of the hostilities. In fact, at the end of April 1945 Churchill was writing to Stalin in the following terms: “There is not much comfort in looking to a future when you and the countries you dominate, plus the Communist countries in many other states, are all drawn up on one side and those who rally to the English-speaking nations on the other. It is quite obvious that their quarrel would tear the world to pieces… Even embarking on a long period of suspicions, of abuse and counter-abuse and of opposing policies would be a disaster hampering the development of world prosperity for the masses” (A. Bullock, Hitler and Stalin, Fontana Press 1993, p. 973). As to Stalin, who never really trusted Roosevelt and Churchill for both personal and ideological reasons but was willing to accommodate them to the extent necessary to accomplish the common aim of defeating Nazi Germany, Zubok clearly shows that at the very latest after the explosion of the US atomics bombs in Japan in 1945, he reverted sharply from a more conciliatory attitude towards his “friends” (now disappeared from the political scene) to his traditional revolutionary-imperial paradigm of foreign policy pushing him to grab as much as he could as long as he could – in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.
The irreversible tipping point from difficult cooperation to Cold War took place, on the US side, in early 1947, before Truman’s speech to the US congress asking for financial aid for Greece and Turkey and outlining his “Truman Doctrine” -when Under-Secretary of State Acheson, heretofore willing to overlook Soviet actions as those of a normal great power, shifted his position in light of Stalin’s demands in Iran, Turkey, Libya and Europe to see the USSR’s policies as a determined global offensive of an ideologically-driven enemy which had to be contained and rolled back, and played a key role in the drafting of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and their ratification by the US Senate; whilst on the Soviet side, the tipping point occurred when Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov walked out of the Paris Marshall Plan Conference, in July 1947.
President Truman addresses the US Congress and outlines his famous “Truman Doctrine”, 1947
Although these specific events and dates were contingent on individual actors and discrete decisions, any one of which were not in themselves inevitable or determinant, the Cold War itself, as defined above, was indeed an inevitable outcome of the five key factors discussed previously which arose as a consequence of WWII.



The US Arms Control Epistemic Community under Eisenhower and the Emergence of an International Arms Control Regime
November 12, 2008 at 7:58 am · Filed under Article Commentary, Cold War History, Military History and tagged: Arms Race, Cold War, Eisenhower, Military-Industrial Complex
Commentary on Emanuel Adler, The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control , International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1, (Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination), Winter, 1992, pp. 101-145).
The author’s main thesis is that the US arms control epistemic community, made up of scientists, strategists and academics of the late 1950s and early 1960s, became aware of the vulnerability of US nuclear weapons and concerned about the reciprocal fear of surprise attack, and predicted that both US national security and avoidance of a nuclear war would be enhanced by persuading the superpowers to collaborate in stabilizing the nuclear balance though arms control. Just as importantly, this epistemic community was then able to reach into places where decisions were made and influence the minds of the people who made them, and even, in time, joined their ranks, thereby turning their ideas into widespread national security policy and practice. Their understanding of the nature and uses of such a prudential association arms control international regime was eventually diffused and accepted by the Soviet Union and became the foundation of US-Soviet cooperation not only over the 30 years from 1960 to 1990, but even beyond the end of the Cold War.
President Eisenhower’s Farewell Address, January 17, 1961 (Part 1)
The innovation process of this group was fueled, according to Adler, by their realization that nuclear deterrence had become unstable and that a catastrophe could occur against the wishes of adversary states, as well as by a number of events such as Soviet ICBM testing in 1957, the launch of Sputnik in the same year, and the Gaither Committee Report proposing an across-the-board military buildup which alarmed Eisenhower and made him more receptive to arms control ideas.
So, if we accept that the selection process of such arms control ideas which best fit the interests of policy makers and passed the test of public opinion started not only under the Kennedy/Johnson Administration, but was already evident under Eisenhower, then “by the time Kennedy entered office significant trends were under way” (Adler 1992, at 125): a framework of negotiations and a policy on which to build; emerging arms control concepts as legitimate foci of policy debate; government personnel and organizational structures with a vested interest in arms control. Thus, the pioneering work accomplished under the Eisenhower administration played a critical (although not sufficient!) role in the adoption of stable deterrence and arms control notions by the Kennedy / Johnson administration.
This transition from disarmament to arms control, eventually accepted by both US and Soviet policy makers and at the basis of their relationship from 1968 onwards, once the USSR achieved party with the US in terms of nuclear missiles, meant that bureaucracies in both countries “had to go through a process of adjustment and conceptual evolution” (Adler 1992, p. 128). Stable deterrence and arms control eventually became a salient paradigm of national security in both the US and USSR and gave rise to arms control agendas and political coalitions capable to carry them out (Adler 1992, p. 133).
The end result was the creation of an international regime of arms control between two powers with widely divergent goals and values, but at the same time with shared interests in these specific areas – in other words, a “prudential association” regime. “Thus, once arms control ideas became embodied in domestic and international procedures and institutions, the domestic and international games were irrevocably changed. Each new generation of leaders had to make its (rational) decisions on the basis of an inherited intellectual code of international arms control ideas which, with the passage of time, was enlarged, refined, and taken for granted… And since the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe, arms control has also become a means for enabling the transition to a new European order” (Adler 1992, p. 140).
President Eisenhower’s Farewell Address, January 17, 1961 (Part 1)
If Adler’s analysis is correct, as I think it is, then Eisenhower’s “new thinking” regarding nuclear weapons as well as his foreign policy becomes even more complex than already assumed. The immediate, short-term image he projected was that of a Republican Cold-Warrior President who was determined to use the US nuclear arsenal not only for deterrence, but also compellence purposes (Korea in 1953, Quemoy and Matsu Islands in 1954 and 1958); in the medium-term, his “New Look” policy purporting to see nuclear weapons as the first line of defense in any war was designed to actually avoid the possibility of any war; in the long-term, his openness to the ideas of the strategic arms control epistemic community shows in a new light his “Open Skies” proposal, his “Atoms for Peace” proposal and even his U-2 surveillance program as they acquire an entirely new meaning and no longer leave the beginning of the Test Ban Treaty Negotiations in 1957 as an isolated moment in his administration.
In effect, at the time Eisenhower took power, the rules of the game for the use of nuclear weapons had not been established, and there was, as Crockatt states, a virtual absence of a negotiating culture” between the US and USSR (Crockatt 1995, at 153). Eisenhower carefully combined the rhetoric of compellence for internal political purposes, with that of a “New Look” policy for both internal budgetary reasons and external deterrence of any wars, whilst beneath these two layers, playing a critical role in encouraging the development and establishment of an entirely new set of rules based on the ideas of the strategic arms control epistemic community which were to establish the fundamental parameters of a prudential association international arms control regime that was to become the corner-stone of US-Soviet relations for the next thirty years and the best guarantor of the “Long Peace” of the second half of the 20th Century between the two rival superpowers. Eisenhower wasn’t playing poker, nor even bridge, but rather three-dimensional chess…
Comments